

Party Organisation and Change of Government: Analytical Framework for Comparative Studies of Social Democratic Parties

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1. Introduction

In this study, a comparative analysis of the party organisations of the British Labour Party and the Social Democratic Party of Japan reveals why the Labour Party (UK) became a governing party, whilst the Social Democratic Party of Japan was unable to gain power. As a preparatory work, this paper intends to provide an analytical framework for studying the Social Democratic Party of Japan, with a particularly comparative focus on the Labour Party.

In its early days of formation, the Social Democratic Party of Japan was said to have been conscious of the party organisations of the Labour Party (UK) and the Social Democratic Party of Germany. One similarity was the party conference as the supreme decision-making body. The Social Democratic Party of Japan and the Labour Party were both influenced by outside-parliamentary parties because of their strong affiliation with outside-parliamentary organisations, e.g. trade unions. Thus, when both parties make decisions, they need to coordinate the demands of a variety of nonparliamentary actors. Therefore, as a preliminary work before considering the party organisational structures, this paper examines what kind of decision-making process has been

made by the Labour Party in important policy areas, e.g. European integration.

2. Analytical Framework

The Labour Party's decisions on the issues of European integration can be examined from two perspectives. The first is that Labour Party ideology has determined its attitude toward European integration. Within the party debate, actors such as the Parliamentary Labour Party, Constituency Labour Party and Trade Unions have each expressed their opinions based on socialist ideologies, such as the achievement of full employment and nationalisation of key industries. Comments in line with the party's ideology have implications for legitimacy in discussions amongst various actors within the party. The party's ideology, however, did not necessarily produce a single conclusion, but rather could serve as a basis for either support or opposition to integration. The first position, therefore, does not explain how the Labour Party has changed its attitude toward European integration, although it is possible to demonstrate the diversity of intraparty discussions.

The second is that the Labour Party's pragmatism has decided whether or not to participate in integration. When opinions within the party are diverse, the party needs a strategy to prevent a serious division of the opposition from within the joint supporters. Although there is a difference of opinion on European integration, the common purpose of both supporters and opponents is to gain (and retain) power. This goal is consistent with both sides, regardless of whether they favour integration. The acquisition and maintenance of power emerge as the acquisition and maintenance of the Government amongst political parties and the leader's position within the party.

British political life has often been characterised as adversarial, and from the standpoint of ‘adversary politics’¹, it is conceivable that the Labour Party would have become hostile to the Conservative Party’s European integration

policy as a matter of course. According to Samuel E. Finer, in adversary politics the party's aim was to establish a compromise between the right and left factions of the party owing to the necessity of party unity in order to secure and maintain the government². In other words, European integration policy will converge on a compromise for both supporters and opponents. Political convergence often opposed to membership applications 'by Conservative Party'. From the viewpoint of the pro-membership party of the Labour Party, it can be seen that this position does not deny the application for membership when the Labour Party won power. From the viewpoint of the anti-membership, it can be regarded as opposing the application for membership although it has the condition 'Conservative Party'. By converging in the middle and aiming to gain and retain power, the Labour Party demonstrates its hostility concerning the Conservative Party during the opposition era.

In this paper, therefore, I conclude that the Labour Party's European integration policy was affected by a pragmatic decision process which aimed to gain and retain power rather than by a decision to realise socialist ideology. The hypothesis is as follows.

If there is a divergence of opinion within the Labour Party over the issue of European integration, the party leadership will determine the policy not by ideological policy decisions but by pragmatic decisions.

- ① If the Labour Party is an opposition party, the party leadership will be hostile to the Conservative Party's policies, with a view to gaining power (government).
- ② If the Labour Party is an opposition party, the party leadership will adopt a conciliatory policy of avoiding intraparty division, with the aim of maintaining intraparty power.

Some examples of the Labour Party's pragmatic attitude toward European

integration are the UK's confrontations over its participation in European integration, such as the first EEC membership application, the second EEC membership application, the EC entry, the 1975 referendum, the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament, and the pledge of referenda to withdraw from the EC/EU. These examples illustrate the problematic nature of European integration during the 22-year period from 1961, when the first EEC membership application was filed, to 1983. This paper discusses in detail the 1975 referendum from amongst these examples. Of course, other cases will be addressed in future studies.

3. 1975 Referendum and Intraparty Confrontation

(1) The Road to a Referendum

In view of the EC entry issue, Douglas Jay, who opposed the EC membership, argued that a referendum should be held. In his book opposing the EC membership, Jay argued that the choice to join the EC was 'an irreparable transfer of decision-making power from the hands of the British people to an organisation not responsible for them (EC)' and that 'it is not permissible for any government to do so without the consent of the voters'³.

Some opponents, like Jay, strongly insisted on holding a referendum, but were not representative of the consensus of opponents. For example, Richard Crossman, who opposed the EC membership, stated that the primary goal of the opponents was 'not a referendum, but to convert the Labour Party into a position of opposing membership'. Underlying this was the belief that the Labour Party would be able to take advantage of the growing anti-EC sentiment amongst voters in general elections rather than through a referendum. For him, the best way was to clarify the Labour Party's opposition; the referendum was only a second-best option if need be.

This best strategy, however, was unlikely to succeed. In some cases,

Wilson did not, in principle, oppose the EC. However, if the Labour Party had clarified its opposition in the 1971 general election, it would have invited members who had voted in favour with strong convictions to leave the party, which would evidently cause the party to split. The opponents thus found it impossible to undertake their preferred option, and so it was logical to adopt the alternative. In this way, the opposition began to put pressure on the leadership to hold a referendum.

On the one hand, it was difficult to say that the voters' views on the referendum were monolithic. In a letter to voters in his district, Tony Benn agreed to hold a referendum. In his letter, Benn said, 'If the people don't participate in this decision, nobody will be seriously thinking about participation. If Britain's participation in a political union with enormous potential for the future is to be realised on the premise that the British people cannot understand the historical importance of EC membership for themselves, it's a very curious thing'⁴. The National Executive Committee in 1970 also stressed the need for a referendum, but there was little interest within the party.

Wilson clearly stated that he had no intention of holding a referendum. In a general election campaign in 1970, Wilson said: 'The answer is no. I have answered this question repeatedly. I am not a person who changes his position on this issue in the desire to vote. The answer to this question is that I will not change my position'⁵.

One of the reasons why the Labour Party leadership, including Wilson, did not accept the referendum option was that it might, in a sense, have been construed as an abandoning of political leadership in the context parliamentary democracy by holding a referendum on decisions on important issues. Secondly, for the Labour Party, which was in a de facto state of division over the EC membership, leaving the final decision to the people had the advantage of avoiding difficult decisions, but at the same time, there was the danger that Britain's withdrawal from the EC might become a reality. Wilson criticised the

Conservative Party for internal reconciliation, but he felt that Britain could not remain an EC member in the future.

Perhaps the biggest obstacle was Wilson's repeated denial of the possibility of a referendum. Had he changed his policy at that point and taken a stand in accepting a referendum, his public reputation as a trustworthy politician would have fallen drastically, and his political career could have well been ended.

At first, Wilson firmly opposed to the referendum, but his attitude gradually softened. This was related to international events. Norway, Denmark and Ireland, which were trying to join the EC together with the UK, were scheduled to hold a referendum on the EC membership. The reasoning was, given that the other three countries were going to hold a referendum, only the British people themselves could decide whether or not to join the EC.

In March 1972, there was a similar trend in France. Georges Pompidou announced that the issue of EC enlargement would be put to a referendum. Though Pompidou's speculation was not meant as a deterrent to Britain's entry, the announcement served as a boost to Britain having a referendum. The French referendum also had the same effect on Britain as the three other countries' referendums. In other words, whilst the French people were able to decide whether or not to allow Britain to join the EC, the theoretical question as to why the British people themselves could not decide whether or not to join the EC became even more relevant.

In response to these moves by other countries to hold referendums, the Labour Party became more active in calling for a referendum. In February 1972, Conservative Neil Marten and Enoch Powell submitted a motion for a referendum in the House of Commons⁶, whereas in a shadow cabinet meeting, Benn called for the Labour Party to agree with the motion. At this point, Benn's argument was not accepted, and a completely different conclusion was drawn in the latter half of March.

At the National Executive Committee meeting on March 22, a motion for a referendum from Marten and Powell was endorsed⁷. In response to this move by the National Executive Committee, in the shadow cabinet, the Labour Party decided to vote in favour of motion⁸, and majority of the Parliamentary Labour Party were also in favour of it⁹.

It has been pointed out that these policy changes by the Labour Party, particularly Wilson's change of stance, were affected by the international context as well as by the situation within the party. David Owen argues that Wilson's turnaround was 'deliberately made to isolate the proponents of EC membership in the shadow cabinet'¹⁰. Behind Wilson's attempt, there was an ongoing feud with Jenkins. Jenkins implicitly criticised Wilson in his March 11, 1972, speech. In his memorandum, Jenkins wrote, 'The intent of this speech was to set out a more sincere and principles-based set of policy positions on Wilson's leadership, which was dragged by short-sighted party triumphs in 1963 and 1964'¹¹. For Wilson, Jenkins' speech was seen as a challenge to his position as the head of the party.

The Wilson-Jenkins confrontation has been closely aligned with the Labour Party's support for the referendum. In April 1972, Jenkins, Thomson and Harold Lever, who were members of the shadow cabinet, announced their resignations.

In his review, Jenkins cited three reasons for opposing a referendum. The first is that the referendum would nullify the vote on October 28, 1971 (the application for the EC membership), that is, it could lead to the withdrawal of the EC. The second is that, in principle, the proponents of the EC membership did not like to adopt a new procedure of referendum within the traditional context of British parliamentary democracy which eschewed such mechanisms. The third is that if a referendum did actually take place, and if the campaign was overheated, the proponents of the EC membership might be excluded from the Labour Party, and the image of the Labour Party as a potential Party of

Government would be tarnished¹².

The resignation of Jenkins surfaced a serious confrontation within the Labour Party, but only three people resigned with him, and it was difficult to say that the resignation caused a critical situation, partly because the impact of the resignation did not spread within the party. Nevertheless, in the shadow cabinet, the proponents of the EC membership sent a message stating that if the Labour Party moved further toward the opposition of the EC membership, their resignations would be unavoidable¹³.

Despite this intraparty confrontation, the motion for a referendum proposed by Marten and Powell was rejected by the House of Commons on April 18, 1972, with 285 to 235 votes against. Of the votes cast by the Labour Party members, 63 abstained, but none opposed¹⁴.

The Labour Party's support for a referendum continued thereafter, and the National Executive Committee issued a statement in July of the same year stating that 'if the renegotiations are successful, it is the policy of Labour Party that the right to decide this question should be given to the people by General Election or Referendum'¹⁵. They added, 'if the renegotiations do not succeed, we shall not regard the Treaty obligations as binding upon us'¹⁶. Again, they were prepared to ask the British people for their decision on the withdrawal from the EC. This National Executive Committee Statement was passed at the party conference by a large margin of 3,407,000 to 1,802,000 votes in favour¹⁷.

Whilst the demand for a referendum had become mainstream, the division within the party over the EC itself was still serious. At the 1972 party conference, the following motions were submitted by John Baldwin of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers¹⁸.

'This Conference declares its complete opposition to entry into the Common Market on any terms, believing that the Treaty of Rome fundamentally denies national independence to the British people.

It further calls on any future Labour Government to withdraw from the Common Market on taking office.’

The motion was a result of 2,958,000 vs. 3,076,000 votes, but it was rejected by a narrow margin¹⁹. Also, McGarvey of the Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers, Shipwrights, Blacksmiths and Structural Workers has submitted a motion against the EC²⁰.

‘This Conference declares its opposition to entry into the Common Market on the terms by Tories and calls on the future Labour Government to reverse any decision for Britain to join unless new terms have been negotiated including the abandonment of the Common Agriculture Policy and Value Added Tax, no limitation on the freedom of a Labour Government to carry out economic plans, regional development, expansion of the Public Sector, Control of Capital Movements, and the preservation of the power of the British Parliament over its legislation and taxation, and, meanwhile, to halt immediately the entry arrangements including all payments to the European Communities and participation in their Institutions in particular the European Parliament, until such terms have been negotiated, and the assent of the British electorate has been given’.

The motion seemed conditionally opposed and, in fact, completely opposed the EC membership. The EC is not allowed, such as accession after reserving all authority as a sovereign state in Britain. It was not a prerequisite for the denial of the European Parliament, which had taken an incomplete step forward, as well as the Common Agricultural Policy that had prevailed in the process of deepening the integration of the EC. In this sense, the motion was a manifestation of a complete hostility concerning the EC in general. As a result, the motion was rejected by 3,355,000 votes versus 2,867,000 votes, but

When Britain's entry to the EC was achieved in January 1973, the debate within the Labour Party over the EC membership had run out of steam. During the party conference that year, the discussion of unconditional withdrawal by Keith Morrell of the Constituency Labour Party only attracted little attention. Morel argued that it was not realistic to remain in the EC once new conditions had been discussed frequently and that renegotiation would not change the nature of the EC²². The motion was rejected by 2,800,000 votes vs. 3,316,000 votes, which only proved that the pro- and anti-membership forces did not change significantly from the previous year²³.

In this way, the Labour Party, whilst coexisting with both pro-EC and anti-EC factions, was in a position to support the referendum as a compromise position between the two factions within the party.

The Labour Party, whose intraparty confrontation temporarily subsided, returned to power with the general election in February 1974. In its manifesto, the Labour Party clarified the following policies²⁷.

- The Labour Party opposes Britain's membership to the European Communities on the basis of the terms negotiated by the Conservative Government.
- We have said that we are ready to re-negotiate.
- In preparing to re-negotiate the entry terms, our main objectives are these:
- Major changes in the COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY, so that it ceases to be a threat to world trade in food products, and so that low-cost producers outside Europe can continue to have access to the British food market.
- New and fairer methods of financing the COMMUNITY BUDGET. Neither the taxes that form the so-called 'own resources' of the Communities, nor the purposes, mainly agricultural support, on which the funds are mainly to be spent, are acceptable to us. We would be ready to contribute to Community finances only such sums as were fair in relation to what is paid and what is received by other member countries.
- As stated earlier, we would reject any kind of international agreement which compelled us to accept increased unemployment for the sake of maintaining a fixed parity, as is required by current proposals for a European ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION. We believe that monetary problems of the European countries can be resolved only in a world-wide framework.
- The retention by PARLIAMENT of those powers over the British economy needed to pursue effective regional, industrial and fiscal policies. Equally, we need an agreement on capital movements which protects our balance of payments and full-employment policies. The Economic interests of COMMONWEALTH and the DEVELOPING COUNTRIES must be better safeguarded. This involves securing continued access to the British markets and, more generally, the adoption by an enlarged Community of trade and aid policies designed to benefit

- No harmonisation of VALUE ADDED TAX which would require us to tax necessities.

From the results of the 1972 and 1973 party conferences, opinions on the EC were divided into groups. Forming a cabinet that was biased toward the opinion of one would therefore be a major risk factor in ensuring stable party management.

Immediately after the formation of the cabinet, Callaghan referred the renegotiation of the terms of membership to the House of Commons. In March 1974, he made it clear to the labour government that ‘Nor shall we aim to conduct the negotiations as a confrontation. It is hardly necessary for me to add that a Labour Government will embark upon these fundamental talks in good

faith not to destroy or to wreck but to adapt and reshape the policies of the Community and our terms of membership in such a way that they will better meet the needs of our own people, as well as of others in Europe, and meet our conception of the Community's relations with other States'²⁸. Callaghan's remarks, therefore, helped to reassure the EC's supporters that they would never negotiate with them from the standpoint of opposing EC members.

On the other hand, Callaghan never forgot to take care of opponents. At the Luxembourg Foreign Ministers' Meeting in January 1974, Callaghan took a hard-line stance, saying that if the EC was found to be harmful to Britain's national interests, the labour government reserved the right to seek amendments to the Rome Treaty and other Treaties²⁹. This statement showed Britain's hard-line stance, but from a different perspective, as it indicated that the precondition for the UK's staying in the EC did not include amendments to the Rome Treaty. The opponents were dissatisfied, but not strongly opposed, that the amendment of the Rome Treaty was not made a condition for remaining.

The Labour Party won the February 1974 General Election but was only able to form a minority government. In a situation where the minimally victorious government could be described as a tradition of England, Wilson was thinking of winning a simple majority by holding another election. Under such circumstances, it was not, however, a suitable tactic from the standpoint of maintaining government that opponents would reveal divisions within the party by attacking the party leadership openly. It can be said that opposition movements lost their degree of freedom amid inter-party conflicts over the maintenance of government.

Wilson announced that a general election would be held again in October 1974, and at the same time, the Labour Party manifesto set out its stance on the EC. In the manifesto, the labour government pledged that 'within twelve months of this election we will give the British people the final say, which will

be binding on the Government-through the ballot box-on whether we accept the terms and stay in or reject the terms and come out'³⁰. This in itself was nothing more than a manifesto commitment of the Labour Party's policy since 1972, and it never became a major issue in the election campaign. The question came after the victory in the general election.

Until then, opponents had undertaken restraint in the interest of maintaining the regime. After gaining a simple majority in the October General Election, dissatisfaction could not be contained any longer. The dissatisfaction erupted at the party conference held in November of the same year. The Labour Party's Peter Price proposed a motion that the Labour Party government should take a very strong stance³¹.

This conference demands that complete safeguards are gained in the negotiations with the European Economic Community on all the following points, before acceptance of any terms is recommended to the British public:

- ①The need for Parliamentary Sovereignty and the right of the British Parliament to reject any European Economic Community legislation, directives or orders, when they are issued, or at any time after they are issued.
- ②The right of the British Parliament to bring any firm in Britain under public ownership, and to control and regulate industry by financial or other means as they require.
- ③The right of the British Parliament to restrict capital inflows and outflows.
- ④The right of the British Parliament to determine its own taxation policy.
- ⑤The right of the British Parliament to subsidise food and import food free of duty.
- ⑥The right of the Commonwealth and under-developed countries to export to Britain on terms at least as favourable as before Britain entered the

European Economic Community.

- ⑦ The right of the British Parliament to control Labour movements into Britain.
- ⑧ The right of the British Parliament to independently determine its own defense policy.

The motion included the logic often used by opponents to maintain the relationship between British parliamentary sovereignty and the Commonwealth. It was obvious, of course, that the EC would not accept these negotiating conditions, and in effect, it was a motion calling for withdrawal. The motion was rejected in an opposition speech by the deputy leader, Edward Short, but the result was close with 3,007,000 to 2,949,000 votes against³². The implications of this motion were that the opposition retained a powerful position within the Labour Party.

Apart from the unstable situation within the party, renegotiation of the terms of membership were to proceed. Callaghan accomplished most of the six items shown in the manifesto through hard-and-soft negotiation. Of these six conditions, it was found that there was no intention that the value-added tax would be uniform amongst the EC countries in the first place and that there had been no attempt to coordinate this amongst the EC countries. The European Monetary Union system would be almost impossible to realise in the near future. Thus, Callaghan had to negotiate only the four remaining points from the beginning. The four points were: ① securing access to the EC market in developing countries, in particular Commonwealth countries; ② Britain's freedom to adopt unique regional, industrial and fiscal policies; ③ reform of the Common Agricultural Policy; ④ reduction of the UK's contribution to the EC budget.

Significant progress had been made in ensuring access to the EC market in developing countries, particularly Commonwealth countries, before the

formal renegotiation process began. The EC has strengthened its food and financial assistance to developing countries and allowed them preferential measures to ensure their access to the EC market without requesting that they increase their imports from the EC. These measures were compiled into the Lome Agreement, which set out cooperation in trade, finance and technology in various areas, as well as in developing countries in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean.

The worries regarding the UK's freedom to implement its own regional, industrial and fiscal policies have come to be understood as largely unfounded vis-à-vis the Labour Party's previous concerns about Brussels interventionism. In addition, the EC's regional policy proved to be beneficial to the UK. When the European Regional Development Fund was established to finance regional policy, the UK was the second net beneficiary³³.

As for the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the concern that the CAP would lead to much higher agricultural prices in the UK than the prices in the world market was temporarily eliminated due to the rapid rise in agricultural prices within the world market! Grain and sugar, the two major commodities of Britain's agricultural imports, were lower in EC prices than in world prices. For some time, therefore, CAP policies were positively evaluated as a means of ensuring a stable food supply for the UK. These three issues were solved without major difficulties, but the problem was the Community budget.

Community budgets require the UK to pay a greater share than any other EC member state. A report issued by the European Commission in 1974 showed that if the existing EC budget framework had been applied to the UK, the share of the British GNP in 1973 was only 16.4% of the total EC budget, whilst the share of the EC budget was 19.9%. Given the same assumption in 1974, the UK was supposed to contribute 22% of the EC budget out of the 15.9% GNP of the EC as a whole³⁴.

In order to change this situation, it was necessary to change the system itself that set the burdens of each country to the EC budget. In February 1975, the Committee proposed a complex scheme for redressing the excessive burdens of Member States on the EC budget. The approach was to prepare budgets in response to the UK's reduction in burdens but without reducing the interests of the recipient countries. However, it was not possible to obtain the consent of each country because the reduction in the UK's burdens would lead to an increase in the burdens of other member countries. The issue of the EC budget could not be settled by renegotiation alone and would be passed to the Dublin European Council that same year.

In addition to the EC budget, the Dublin European Council had a large number of agenda items, but Wilson was eager to settle the renegotiation there and then. The Dublin European Council agreed to amend the committee's proposal. By setting a ceiling on the refund, the further economic burden imposed by West Germany was brought to a halt, and the system was designed to provide economic benefits to the UK, where a current account surplus was expected, by making it possible to receive the refund even if the current account surplus was indeed achieved. This created a new system of contributions. Thus, Wilson and Callaghan concluded a year-long negotiation process.

(3) Referendum and Recommendation to Stay in the EC

In January 1975, 2 months before the renegotiation was completed, Wilson formally announced that a referendum would be held to question Britain's membership of the EC³⁵. At the referendum, Wilson decided to issue a recommendation on whether the government would accept the terms of membership and a recommendation in favour of remaining in the EC. Jenkins, who had resigned from the shadow cabinet over the referendum, had two conditions in favour of Wilson's bid for a referendum. The first was not to

submit the referendum bill to the House of Commons until the outcome of the renegotiation, and the second was to make recommendations on whether the government should remain in the EC in accordance with the terms of entry obtained via renegotiation³⁶.

Recommendations from the government can be explained in terms of strengthening the bargaining power with the EC and the responsibilities of the government itself within its own country. Even though the Labour Party government was renegotiating the terms of entry to the EC, as there was no explanation to the people about whether or not it would be possible, the EC suspected Britain's enthusiasm to falter and thus not enter into negotiations. The government's failure to explain to the public the pros and cons of renegotiating the terms of membership would leave an impression to the public that the government also failed to negotiate and, as a result, will lead to loss of public trust in the government. The Labour leadership therefore acted in line with Jenkins' request.

For example, Callaghan said, 'once renegotiations are completed, Her Majesty's Government will consider whether British demands have been accepted, and when submitting the results of renegotiations to the British people, we will clarify the government's decision on the terms of entry achieved'³⁷. Decisions that deviate greatly from the practice of the parliamentary system were then made. Wilson made the following speech in the House of Commons³⁸:

'The circumstances of this referendum are unique, and the issue to be decided is one on which strong views have long been held which cross party lines. The Cabinet has, therefore, decided that, if when the time comes there are members of the Government, including members of the Cabinet, who do not feel able to accept and support the Government's recommendation; whatever it may be, they will, once the recommendation has been

announced, be free to support and speak in favour of a different conclusion in the referendum campaign’.

This speech stated that the principle of solidarity and responsibility of the cabinet would be suspended in a referendum on the question of whether or not they would remain in the EC. At the party conferences held since 1971, each year, a motion was submitted calling for the withdrawal of the EC, and although the vote was rejected every time, it was common for the margin to be narrow. In other words, neither the pro- and anti-membership groups changed their positions. Within the Labour Party, where the division had become fixed, Wilson feared that imposing the principle of solidarity would lead to the resignation of opposition ministers and confusion within the party.

Wilson held a referendum rather than a general election as a way to ask whether or not to join the EC. In the referendum, the government issued some recommendations to the people as a result of renegotiation, and in the election campaign, it decided to suspend the principle of solidarity and communal responsibility.

Immediately after that decision, the renegotiation of the European Council in Dublin faced the challenge of making government recommendations. Although the cabinet had a balance between supporters and opponents in organising itself, many cabinet members became supporters during the process of renegotiation, e.g. Fred Peart, the Regional Prentice, John Morris, Merlyn Rees and Lord Shepherd. Despite of that, Foot, Castle, Shore, Ben, Silkin, Eric Varley and William Ross remained as opponents. Wilson, in front of these ministers, voted 16 to 7 on whether or not to recommend that the UK remain members of EC staying on terms obtained through renegotiation³⁹.

Whilst the cabinet decided to make a recommendation to stay, opposition parties in the Congress made a motion early in the morning, shaking the government⁴⁰. In addition, Ian Mikardo launched a campaign against the

National Executive Committee. Mikardo requested and received acknowledgement from the National Executive Committee that the terms obtained by renegotiation were completely inadequate in view of the objectives set out in the last two election manifestos, and how to conduct a campaign to withdraw from the EC should be decided at a Special Party Conference⁴¹.

However, the opposition was restrained by the union's belief that it would not be advisable for Jack Jones, the General Secretary of the largest transport and general trade union, to override the party's leadership.

In April 1975, the Parliament debated on the government's recommendation to stay in the EC, a move which was supported by both supporters and opponents, but a vote of 396 to 170 agreed on the government's recommendation⁴². At first glance, the difference in votes was misunderstood to be due to the opposition of the Conservative Party members. However, 145 Labour Party members voted in rebellion with 33 abstentions and only 137 voting in favour⁴³. It can be said that the vote was passed *with* the cooperation of the Conservative Party. In the Congressional Labour Party, the majority actually opposed the EC membership.

Outside the party, the National Executive Committee took the following stance. 'A majority of the National Executive Committee believe that the terms, even as renegotiated, do not satisfy Britain's requirements and therefore oppose Britain's continuing membership of the Common Market'⁴⁴. At the same time, all members of the party were given the freedom to move away from the Party and Party organisations in order to act in accordance with their own beliefs. In a different view, the individual members of the party were allowed to engage in free activities, but they did not show how the party organisations would be involved in the campaign.

At the Special Party Conference held in April 1975, the debate balanced the opposition with the supporters. The opposition, e.g. Bryan Stanley of the Post Office Engineering Union, supported the position of the National

Executive Committee, and when the Labour Party argued that it had to launch an EC withdrawal campaign, both sides sharply opposed, as opponents immediately returned the criticism⁴⁵. The National Executive Committee Statement was passed by a large margin of 3,724,000 to 1,860,000 votes⁴⁶. The Economist predicted that the Transport and General Workers Union, the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers, the National Union of Mineworkers, the Association of Scientific, Technical and Management Workers, the National Union of Public Employment Workers and the National Union of Electric Workers, are amongst the leading trade unions and the National Union of the United Workers, the National Union of Political and Management Workers and the National Union of Electrical and Political Trade Unions, the National Union of the United Union and the National Union of Political and Political Workers, are amongst the leading trade unions and vote against the declaration by the National Union of the United Union. The Workers' Party in the electoral districts had 2 to 1 majority in favour of the National Executive Committee Statement⁴⁷.

Even though majority of the Labour Party members, including those from outside the House of Commons, opposed the EC membership, they avoided making monetary contributions and using them in party campaigns. Although the finances of the Labour Party were not abundant, it was confirmed that the party would take a neutral stance concerning the campaign, partly because the implementation of the campaign that had been aimed at either party could have provoked a backlash from the leading trade unions and partly because the General Secretary of the Party, Ron Hayward, had drawn up a guideline to prevent the use of party organisations in the campaign.

(4) Referendum Campaign

The Labour Party removed the whip from party members, allowing a free vote on the matter of the EC membership. Such trans-partisan voting

campaigns were rare in UK political life. Competition between political parties, characterised by ‘adversary politics’ between the Conservative and Labour parties, had been a characteristic of British politics since the end of World War II. However, the referendum exposed what was more intraparty than inter-party rivalry, and it was impossible to separate the opposition from the supporters along party lines. This led to the formation of bipartisan pro-EC and anti-EC organisations and the development of associated campaigns.

The supporters established the ‘Britain in Europe’ campaign, whilst the opponents established ‘the National Referendum Campaign’. Britain in Europe was headed by prominent politicians of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal parties. From the Conservative Party, there was former Prime Minister Edward Heath; from the Labour Party, Minister Roy Jenkins; and from the Liberal Party, former Liberal Party Leader Jo Grimond. In contrast, Marten and Powell, who had submitted their motion to the House of Commons, participated in the National Referendum Campaign by Benn, Shore, Football and Castle from the Labour Party. However, it must be stated that they were a little less well-known.

In addition to the visibility of the leaders of the two organisations, the National Referendum Campaign was viewed as an alliance of extremes of both the Left and Right⁴⁸. The ideologically distant struggle between the Left and Right sides of the Workers’ Party was unsuccessful and failed to launch effective campaigns. And above all, it was the difference in financial power that separated the fates of the two organisations. Both organisations received a government subsidy of £125,000, Britain in Europe received a subsidy of 10% of the total income, whilst the National Referendum Campaign received a subsidy of as much as 90% of the total income. The former received generous support from the British industry, whilst the latter received little support from trade unions⁴⁹. Despite the support of many trade unions for withdrawal, only the transport and general trade unions donated money⁵⁰.

Before the campaign, the differences between the two organisations were evident, but the two main points of contention were as follows. One was the issue of Britain's sovereignty. The opponents argued that 'the people who advocated EC membership persistently and insidiously continued to say that we have come to an end as a State. The long and honoured history of the British state and its people has come to an end. We are so weak that we have to accept the same conditions, penalties and restrictions imposed when we defeat the war. We have no choice but to stay in the cage of the common market',⁵¹. The proponents argued that the UK, its people, and history were undervalued as opponents and made statements invoking nationalistic support.

The supporters, on the other hand, also objected to nationalism in the form of stimulus. Heath argued, 'One of the sadder aspects of the campaign is the way the anti-Marketeers are talking Britain down. They tell us that the British people are too weak to hold their own in the European Community, that we are not able to compete in the open market of Europe and that we cannot survive the rigours of fair competition. I reject totally that kind of defeatist talk. They may have lost faith but I have not',⁵².

The opponents argued that the British would survive if Britain withdrew from the EC. The proponents claimed that the British people were confident that they would not withdraw from the EC and that the UK could gain a leading position once more even if they remained in the EC.

Another issue was economics⁵³. Benn argued that the EC membership was producing a large number of unemployed people. According to him, 137,000 jobs were lost as a result of the direct impact of the EC membership, and 360,000 more jobs were lost due to the austerity of the current account deficit caused by the EC membership⁵⁴. Jenkins responded to this remark by saying, 'It's becoming increasingly difficult for me to treat Mr. Benn's remarks as seriously as the remarks of economic ministers'. The issue of economic affairs was so heated that it had developed into a personal attack amongst

ministers, which meant that Wilson was not willing to deal with either side directly.

The referendum campaign was a trans-partisan campaign with both supporters and opponents, but from the outset, public support was consistently high. When renegotiation was completed at the European Council in March 1975, the pro-EC faction, which had been the majority of the British people, allowed the remaining supporters to increase. Since then, the situation remained unchanged in favour of those who remained in the EC throughout the campaign, and before the vote, no one believed that the opponents would win. On June 5, a vote of 67.2% in favour and 32.8% against was returned in answer to the question⁵⁵: ‘Do you think the UK should remain in the EC?’⁵⁶

Along with this difference of votes, it is important that majority of all four parts of the UK (England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland) were in favour. In addition, according to Anthony King’s survey, majority of the votes from the Labour Party’s social class were in favour, which formed the backbone of the Labour Party’s supporters, i.e. manual labourers and labour union members⁵⁷. This meant that people of various backgrounds supported remaining in the EC. Furthermore, nobody opposed to hearing the voice of the people, and Benn and other such opponents accepted the defeat graciously.

(5) Conclusion

The resignation of De Gaulle, who had prevented Britain from applying to join the EEC, increased the possibility that Britain’s entry to the EC would become a reality. In response to the increasing possibility of the EC membership, the issue of European integration had come to the attention of the Labour Party. In 1970, the EC membership became a major issue to the extent that a Special Party Conference was held. From the first EEC membership application, the party’s attitude toward European integration has remained divided. Divergent opinions also remained within the trade unions,

constituency Labour Party and the Parliamentary Labour Party, as well as within the shadow cabinet.

Discussions continued at the 1971 Party Conference without any convergence of opinions, but opposition parties retained overwhelming power within the party nonetheless. Opposition to the EC membership in the same year's Party Conference was supported by an overwhelming majority, and the party leadership was forced to oppose the EC membership. The party leaders clearly expressed their opposition to the EC by holding the Parliamentary Labour Party 'three-line-whip' in the House of Commons voting when on the application for the EC membership. Many members violated party restraints and voted against each other, but the party leadership took a pragmatic approach to the pro-member factions in two ways. Firstly, the Labour Party maintained a position of opposition to the entry of the 'Conservative Party' to the EC. Secondly, they did not sack anyone who broke the party whip and made a counter-ballot irrespective of their responsibility. These two factors were the result of the leadership's hostility to the Conservative Party's policies – in order to *gain* power from the Conservative Party – as well as its own attempts to *maintain* power without undermining the leadership's own internal power base (hypotheses a and b).

The application for the EC membership, which was supported by the Conservative Party, finally came to fruition when the UK became an EC member in 1973. Nonetheless, even as UK becomes a member of the EC, it still faced problems. When the Labour Party returned to power in 1974, it renegotiated the terms of membership with the EC and held a referendum.

4. Conclusion

This paper has examined European integration, which has been one of the most important policies of the Labour Party. The Labour Party has often been

classified as a policy-oriented organisation, and it has adopted a pragmatic strategy aimed at gaining power rather than pursuing ideological-oriented policies. It was difficult for the Labour Party, which is believed to have had a low degree of autonomy within the party leadership owing to the former strength of trade unions in the UK, to adopt a purely ideological strategy in order to secure public support whilst avoiding further intraparty division. Of course, the issue of European integration is not the only one that leads to the ascension to government, but a strategy by which the Labour Party, which is strongly organised outside the party, avoids the control of certain trade unions, is also considered effective in other policy areas.

On the other hand, the Social Democratic Party of Japan, like the Labour Party, plays an important role in the party conference. Under the formal system, the Social Democratic Party of Japan has been less affected by trade unions than the UK Labour Party was, yet it has still been informally affected. The General Council of Trade Unions of Japan had to negotiate with the leadership of the Social Democratic Party of Japan before the party congress, thereby influencing the party's activities. Therefore, the relationship between the extra-parliamentary organisations and the parliamentary parties, along with the Labour and the Social Democratic Party of Japan, has been important.

The Labour Party was able to alleviate union dissatisfaction by trying to gain power, whilst the Social Democratic Party of Japan showed a doctrinal attitude over important policies. As a future research issue, it is necessary to analyse the attitude of the Social Democratic Party of Japan toward important policies in addition to increasing the number of cases in which the Labour Party's attitude toward European integration is analysed. On that basis, we intend to examine how these two political party organisations have been affected by them as a factor in defining the policy attitudes of the two parties.

(Endnotes)

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- 5 Uwe Kitzinger (1973) *Diplomacy and Persuasion*, London: Thames and Hudson, p. 296.
- 6 *Hansard*, 3 February 1972, Series5, vol. 878, col. 2011.
- 7 Labour Party (1972) *Report of the 71st Annual Conference of the Labour Party*, London: Transport House Smith Square, p. 34.
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- 9 Peter Byrd (1975) "The Labour Party and the European Community, 1970-1975," *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 13, No. 4, p. 474.
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- 11 Roy Jenkins (1991) *A Life at the Centre*, London: Macmillan, p. 339.
- 12 *Ibid.*, pp. 341-342.
- 13 *The Times*, 11 April 1972.
- 14 *Hansard*, 22 April 1972, Series5, vol. 878, col. 2232.
- 15 Labour Party (1972) *op. cit.*, p. 383.
- 16 *Ibid.*, p. 383.
- 17 *Ibid.*, p. 388.
- 18 *Ibid.*, p. 200.
- 19 *Ibid.*, p. 219.
- 20 *Ibid.*, p. 197.
- 21 *Ibid.*, p. 217.
- 22 Labour Party (1973) *Report of the 72nd Annual Conference of the Labour Party*, London: Transport House Smith Square, pp. 283-284.
- 23 *Ibid.*, p. 294.
- 24 *Ibid.*, p. 281.
- 25 *Ibid.*, p. 294.
- 26 They said that their return to the cabinet was due to their belief that the EC's accession had been realized and that the past problems had been solved as a result of the achievement of the objectives. But this was a sophistication, which, in practice, would not have been tolerated by the party as a bystander.
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- 28 *Hansard*, 19 March 1974, Series5, vol. 870, cols. 865-866.
- 29 Luke Nichter (2015) *Richard Nixon and Europe: The Reshaping of the Postwar Atlantic World*, New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 175.
- 30 Dale (2000b) *op. cit.*, pp. 211.
- 31 Labour Party (1974) *Report of the 73rd Annual Conference of the Labour Party*, London: Transport House Smith Square, p. 251.
- 32 *Ibid.*, p. 363.
- 33 Anthony King (1977) *Britain Says Yes*, Washington D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, p. 76.
- 34 Butler and Kitzinger, *op. cit.*, p. 40.
- 35 *Hansard*, 23 January 1975, Series5, vol. 884, col. 1745.
- 36 Jenkins, *op. cit.*, p. 400.
- 37 *The Times*, 5 June 1974.
- 38 *Hansard*, 23 January 1975, Series5, vol. 884, col. 1746.
- 39 PRO, CAB128/39, CC (68), 18 March 1975, 25th *Conclusions*.
- 40 *Hansard*, 23 March 1974, Series5, vol. 887, cols. 891.
- 41 Barbara Castle (1980) *The Castle Diary 1974-1976*, London: Weidenfeld, p. 750.
- 42 *Hansard*, 9 April 1975, Series5, vol. 889, col. 1369.
- 43 *Ibid.*
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- 45 Labour Party (1975) *op. cit.*, p. 312.
- 46 *Ibid.*, p. 318.
- 47 *The Economist*, 3 May 1975, p. 38.
- 48 King, *op. cit.*, p. 113.
- 49 Parliamentary Papers (1975) *Referendum on United Kingdom Membership of the European Community: Accounts of Campaigning Organisations*, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, p. 3, p. 18.
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- 54 *The Times* 19 May 1975.
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- 56 Butler and Kitzinger, *op. cit.*, p. 22.
- 57 King, *op. cit.*, p. 133.