

ジョン・ステュアート・ミル

『代議制統治論』自筆草稿

—— 第10章と第11章（翻刻） ——

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トーマス・ロックリー

日本大学図書館法学部分館（法学部図書館）は、ジョン・ステュアート・ミル（John Stuart Mill, 1806-1873）の『代議制統治論』自筆草稿を所蔵している。私たち著者は、前稿に引き続き、本草稿の翻刻に取り組んでいる。本稿で翻刻されるのは、『代議制統治論』第10章と第11章である。

翻刻に際して、翻刻文に下線が引かれているものは、ミル本人によって下線が引かれていることを表している。翻刻文に二重の下線が引かれているものは、私たちが翻刻できなかったものを、灰色に着色されているものは、いまだその翻刻に確信が持てないものを表している。（ ）で示された部分はミルによるもの、[]で示された部分は、筆者たちが補ったものである。

凡例

- 下 線：ミル本人によって引かれた線
- 二重下線：筆者たちが翻刻できなかった単語
- 灰色部分：翻刻に確信が持てない単語
- （ ）：ミル本人が記したもの
- []：筆者たちが補ったもの

Bibliography : [Considerations on Representative Government]. [s.l.] : [s.n.]. [1860].
 Untitled autograph manuscript. 228 leaves in 11 [A to K] quires. A quire: 24 leaves, B quire: 24 leaves, C to J quire: each 20 leaves, K quire: 20 leaves (7 leaves blank).

私たちのこれまでの翻刻結果、および原典と草稿との対照は、以下の表のとおりである。

表1 掲載誌／Journals

Preface	「ジョン・ステュアート・ミル『代議政治論』自筆草稿——序言と第1章（翻刻）——」『法学紀要』60巻、2019年
[Ch. 1] To what extent forms of government are a matter of choice	John Stuart Mill's Autographed Draft Manuscript "Considerations on Representative Government." Transcription of Preface and Chapter 1. <i>HÖGAKU KIYŌ</i> . Vol. 60. 2019. https://www.publication.law.nihon-u.ac.jp/bulletin/bulletin_60.html
[Ch. 2] The Criterion of a good Form of Government	「ジョン・ステュアート・ミル『代議制統治論』自筆草稿——第2章と第3章（翻刻）——」『政経研究』56巻4号、2020年
[Ch. 3] That the ideally best form of government is representative government	John Stuart Mill's Autographed Draft Manuscript "Considerations on Representative Government." Transcription of Chapter 2 and 3. <i>SEIKEI KENKYŪ</i> . Vol. 56 (4). 2020. https://www.publication.law.nihon-u.ac.jp/political/political_56_4.html
[Ch. 4] To what society representative government is inapplicable	「ジョン・ステュアート・ミル『代議制統治論』自筆草稿——第4章と第5章（翻刻）——」『政経研究』57巻1号、2020年
[Ch. 5] What are the proper functions of representative bodies	John Stuart Mill's Autographed Draft Manuscript "Considerations on Representative Government." A Transcription of Chapter 4 and 5. <i>SEIKEI KENKYŪ</i> . Vol. 57 (1). 2020. https://www.publication.law.nihon-u.ac.jp/political/political_57_1.html
[Ch. 6] Of the Infirmities & dangers to which representative government is liable	「ジョン・ステュアート・ミル『代議制統治論』自筆草稿——第6章と第7章（翻刻）——」『政経研究』57巻2号、2020年
[Ch. 7] Of True & False Democracy; the representation of all, & the representation of the majority only	John Stuart Mill's Autographed Draft Manuscript "Considerations on Representative Government." A Transcription of Chapter 6 and 7. <i>SEIKEI KENKYŪ</i> . Vol. 57 (2). 2020. https://www.publication.law.nihon-u.ac.jp/political/political_57_2.html

[Ch. 8] Of the extension of the suffrage	「ジョン・ステュアート・ミル『代議制統治論』自筆草稿——第8章と第9章（翻刻）——」『政経研究』57巻3号、2020年 John Stuart Mill's Autographed Draft Manuscript "Considerations on Representative Government." A Transcription of Chapter 8 and 9. <i>SEIKEI KENKYŪ</i> . Vol. 57 (3). 2020. https://www.publication.law.nihon-u.ac.jp/political/political_57_3.html
[Ch. 9] Should there be two stages of election ?	
[Ch. 10] Of the mode of voting	「ジョン・ステュアート・ミル『代議制統治論』自筆草稿——第10と第11章（翻刻）——」『法学紀要』62巻、2021年 John Stuart Mill's Autographed Draft Manuscript "Considerations on Representative Government." A Transcription of Chapter 10 and 11. <i>HŌGAKU KIYŌ</i> . Vol. 62. 2021.
[Ch. 11] Of the duration of Parliament	
[Ch. 16] Of Nationality, as connected with Representative Government	「ジョン・ステュアート・ミル『代議政治論』自筆草稿——第16、17、18章（翻刻）——」『法学紀要』61巻、2020年 John Stuart Mill's Autographed Draft Manuscript "Considerations on Representative Government." Transcription of Chapter 16, 17 and 18. <i>HŌGAKU KIYŌ</i> . Vol. 61. 2020. https://www.publication.law.nihon-u.ac.jp/bulletin/bulletin_61.html
[Ch. 17] Of the government of dependencies by a free state	
[Ch. 18] Of Federal Representative Governments	
川又祐「J.S. ミル『代議政治論』自筆草稿（日本大学法学部図書館所蔵）について」『政経研究』52巻2号、2015年 Kawamata. H. "John Stuart Mill's Autographed Draft Manuscript Considerations on Representative Government in the Nihon University College of Law Library." <i>SEIKEI KENKYŪ</i> . Vol. 52 (2). 2015. https://www.publication.law.nihon-u.ac.jp/political/political_52_2.html	

表2 ミル『代議制統治論』対照表／A comparison between the manuscript and the first edition of *Considerations*

帖・紙葉	自筆草稿章題	原典初版章題
A_002-013	To what extent forms of government are a matter of choice.	Ch.1. TO WHAT EXTENT FORMS OF GOVERNMENT ARE A MATTER OF CHOICE.
A_014-024～ B_001-008	The Criterion of a good Form of Government	Ch.2. THE CRITERION OF A GOOD FORM OF GOVERNMENT.
B_009-022	That the ideally best form of government is representative government	Ch.3. THAT THE IDEALLY BEST FORM OF GOVERNMENT IS REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT.

B_023-024~ C_001-009	To what societies representative government is inapplicable	Ch4. UNDER WHAT SOCIAL CONDITIONS REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IS INAPPLICABLE.
C_010-020~ D_001-002	What are the proper functions of representative bodies	Ch.5. OF THE PROPER FUNCTIONS OF REPRESENTATIVE BODIES.
D_003-018	Of the infirmities & dangers to which representative government is liable.	Ch.6. OF THE INFIRMITIES AND DANGERS TO WHICH REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IS LIABLE.
D_019-020~ E_001-013	Of True & False Democracy; the representation of all, & the representation of the majority only.	Ch.7. OF TRUE AND FALSE DEMOCRACY; REPRESENTATION OF ALL, AND REPRESENTATION OF THE MAJORITY ONLY.
E_014-020~ F_001-011	Of the extension of the suffrage.	Ch.8. OF THE EXTENSION OF THE SUFFRAGE.
F_012-020~ G_001	Of the mode of voting.	Ch.10. OF THE MODE OF VOTING.
G_002-004	Of the duration of Parliaments	Ch.11. OF THE DURATION OF PARLIAMENTS.
G_005-011	Ought there to be two or only one House of Parliament in a representative constitution ?	Ch.13. OF A SECOND CHAMBER.
G_012-020~ H_001-003	Of local representative bodies.	Ch.15. OF LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE BODIES.
H_004-017	Of the Executive in a representative government	Ch.14. OF THE EXECUTIVE IN A REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT.
H_018-020~ I_001-006	Of Nationality, as connected with Representative Government	Ch.16. OF NATIONALITY, AS CONNECTED WITH REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT.
I_007-017	Of Federal Representative Governments.	Ch.17. OF FEDERAL REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENTS.
I_018-020~ J_001-012	Of the government of dependencies by a free state.	Ch.18. OF THE GOVERNMENT OF DEPENDENCIES BY A FREE STATE.
J_013-019	Should there be two stages of election ?	Ch.9. SHOULD THERE BE TWO STAGES OF ELECTION ?
J_020 ~ K_001-012	Ought pledges to be required from members of parliament ?	Ch.12. OUGHT PLEDGES TO BE REQUIRED FROM MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT ?
K_014	Preface.	PREFACE.

**John Stuart Mill's Autographed Draft
Manuscript “Considerations on
Representative Government.”
A Transcription of Chapter 10 and 11.**

**Hiroshi KAWAMATA
Atsushi YOSHINO
Yusuke ARAI
Thomas LOCKLEY**

Nihon University College of Law (NUCL) Library houses a John Stuart Mill's autographed draft manuscript of “ Considerations on Representative Government ” ca. 1860. This time, we, 4 authors transcribe the chapter 10 and 11 from it.

The underline is written by Mill himself. Regrettably, the double underlined parts are the words which we couldn't transcribe. Words about which we are unsure are gray colored. Parentheses () are by Mill. Brackets [] are by us.

Bibliography: [Considerations on Representative Government]. [s.l.] : [s.n.]. [1860]. Untitled autograph manuscript. 228 leaves in 11 [A to K] quires. A quire: 24 leaves, B quire: 24 leaves, C to J quire: each 20 leaves, K quire: 20 leaves (7 leaves blank).

F_012 to G_001. [Chapter 10]

F_012

[Left side of page. F quire 011 verso. In pencil.]

discuss somewhere the subject of
two stages of election.

[Right side of page. F quire 012 recto.]

Of the mode of voting

The question of greatest moment which arises respecting the mode of voting, is that of secrecy[sic. secrecy] or publicity ; & to this we will in the first instance address ourselves.

I have no desire to make the discussion turn on any sentimentalities respecting skulking or cowardice. Secrecy is justifiable in many cases, imperative in some, & it is not cowardice to seek protection against evils which are honestly avoidable. Neither do I pretend that no cases are conceivable in which secret voting is preferable to public. But I must contend that these cases, in affairs of a political character, are the exception, not the rule.

This is one of the instances in which, as already noticed, the spirit of an institution, the impression it makes on the mind of the individual citizen, is one of the most important parts of its operation. The spirit of vote by ballot — the impression it is calculated to make upon an ordinary mind — is that the suffrage is given him for himself — for his individual use & benefit, & not in trust for the public. For if it is a trust, ought not those for whose good it is _____⁽¹⁾ to know how its duties are discharged. This false impression may well be made on the public, since it

has been made on most of those who,
of late years, have been conspicuous as advocates of the ballot.
Mr Bright & his school of democrats think themselves
greatly concerned in maintaining that the franchise is what they call
a right, not a trust. Now this single idea, taking root in the
general mind, does greater mischief than all the good which the
ballot could do, at the highest estimate even made of it.
In whatever way we define or understand the idea of a right,
this is most certain, that no human being can possibly have a right

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(in any but a legal sense) to power over others, & the exercise of any political function
whether as an elector or a representative, is power over others. Those
who say that the suffrage is not a trust but a right, can scarcely
have considered the consequences their doctrine leads to. If it is a
right, if it is his own, for his own
benefit, on what ground can we blame him for selling it ?
or for using it to recommend
himself to any one whom it is his interest to please ? Has he not a
right to use what is his own, in any way he considers to be for his own interest ?
The suffrage is indeed due to him, as a means among other _____⁽²⁾ & his own
protection, but
only against injustice or against
conduct by which his interest is affected without due knowledge or due
consideration of what it is ; _____⁽³⁾ the same protection against
injustice or inconsideration to every one of his fellow citizens as to himself ; His vote
is
not legitimately[in pencil] a matter in which he has any[in pencil] choice ;

it has no more to do with personal inclination than the vote of a jurymen, it is a matter of strict duty, he is bound to give it according to the best & most conscientious opinion he can form of the public interest. Whoever has any other idea of it **than** this is unfit to have the suffrage ; its whole effect on him is to pervert instead of elevating his mind. Instead of opening his heart to the feeling of an exalted patriotism & the obligation of public duty, it awakens & nourishes in him the very same feelings & purposes, on a humbler scale, which actuate a despot & an oppressor. Now an ordinary citizen, who is placed in any social position or on whom devolves any social function, is certain to think & feel respecting the obligations of his position exactly what society appears to think & feel in conferring it upon him.

F_014

What seems to be expected from him by society forms a standard which he may fall below, but which he certainly will not rise above. And the interpretation which he is almost sure to put on secret voting, is that he is not bound to give his vote with any reference to those who are not allowed to know how he gives it.

This is the decisive reason why no argument is **trouble** from the use of the ballot in clubs & private societies to its use in parliamentary elections. A member of a club is under no obligation to consider the wishes or interests of any one else. He declares nothing by his vote but that he is or is not willing to associate, in a manner more or less close, with a particular person. This is a matter on which it is universally admitted

that his own pleasure
 or inclination is entitled to decide : & that he should be able so
 to decide it without risking a quarrel, is better for
 everybody, the rejected party included. An additional reason
 rendering the ballot unobjectionable in such cases, is that it does not necessarily
 or naturally lead to lying. The persons concerned are of the same class
 & rank, & it would be considered improper in one of them to ask the
 other any question as to how he had voted. It is far otherwise in
 parliamentary elections, & is likely to remain so, as long as the social
 relations exist which produce the demand for the ballot — as long as
 one person is sufficiently the superior of another to think himself
 entitled to dictate his vote. And while this is the case,
 silence or an evasive answer is certain to be construed
 as proof that the vote given had not been that which was desired.

In any political election, even by universal suffrage, & the case
 still stronger in the case of a limited suffrage, every voter is under an

F_015

absolute moral obligation to consider the interest of the public, not his own private
 advantage
 & vote to the best of his judgment exactly as he would feel bound to do
 if he were the sole voter & the election depended
 only upon him. This being admitted, it follows that
 like any other public duty, it should be performed
 in the face & subject to the criticism of the whole public ; every one
 of them having not only an interest in the mode of its performance
 but a good title to consider himself wronged if it is performed
 otherwise than honestly & carefully. Undoubtedly

neither this nor any other maxim of political morality is absolutely **indefeasible** ; it may be overruled by still more cogent considerations. But its weight is such that the cases which admit of a departure from it must be of a highly exceptional character.

It may undoubtedly be the fact that if we attempt, by publicity, to make the voter responsible to others for his vote, he will be practically made responsible for it to some powerful individual whose interest is more opposed to the general interest of the community, than that of the voter himself would be if, by the shield of secrecy, he were **relieved** from responsibility to anybody. When this is the condition in a high degree, of a large proportion of the voters, the ballot may be the less of two evils. When the voters are slaves, anything may be tolerated which enables them to **shake** off the yoke. The strongest case for the ballot is when the mischievous power of the Few over the Many is an increasing evil.

In the decline of the Roman republic the reasons for the ballot were irresistible. The oligarchy were yearly becoming richer & more tyrannical, the people poorer & more impotent, & it was necessary

F_016

to erect stronger & stronger barriers against improper interference with the franchise. I feel no doubt that the ballot had a highly beneficial operation in the Athenian constitution. An Athenian voter was not sufficiently dependent to be regularly coerced, but he might have been bribed, or he might have been terrified by a **mob** or by the lawless outrages of a knot of individuals, which were not uncommon even at Athens

among the youth of rank & fortune. The ballot was in these cases a valuable means of order, & conduced to the Eunomia by which Athens was distinguished among the ancient commonwealths.

But in modern European states & especially in this country, the power of coercion has declined & is declining, & bad voting is now much less to be apprehended from the influences to which the voter is subject from without, than from the sinister interests & bad feelings which belong to him individually or through his class. To secure him against the first at the cost of relieving him from all restraint upon the last, would be to exchange a smaller & diminishing evil for a greater & increasing one. On this topic, & on the question generally as applicable to England at the present time, I can do nothing better than to quote a few passages from a pamphlet of my own published about ⁽⁴⁾ ago, on Parliamentary Reform

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On the other debateable [sic. debatable] points connected with the mode of voting, it is not necessary to employ so many words. The system of personal representation, as devised by Mr Hare, renders necessary the employment of voting papers. But it appears to me absolutely indispensable that the signature of the elector should be affixed to the voting paper

F_017

at the hustings, or if there be no polling place conveniently situated as some public place open to all the world, & in the presence of a responsible public officer. The proposal which has been made of allowing the voting papers to be filled up at his own residence & sent by a messenger or by the post, I should regard as perfectly fatal. The

act would be done in the absence of the **better** & the presence of all the worse influences. The briber might then, in the shelter of privacy, see with his own eyes his bargain fulfilled & the intimidator could see the extorted obedience rendered irrevocably on the spot, while the salutary counter influence of the presence of those who knew his sentiments, & the inspiring effect of the sympathy of those of his own party or opinion, would be **wanting**.

The polling places should be so numerous as to be within easy reach of every voter, & no expenses of conveyance, at the cost of the candidate, should be tolerated for a moment. The infirm, or they only on medical certificate, should have the right of claiming suitable carriage conveyance at the cost of the state, or of the locality. Hustings, poll clerks, & all the necessary expenses of elections should be at the public charge. Not only the candidate should not be required, he should not be permitted, to incur any (but at most a trifling) expense for his own election. Mr Hare proposes that a sum of £ 50 should be required from every one who places his name on the list of candidates, to prevent persons who have no real chance of success, & no serious intention of attempting it, from becoming candidates in wantonness or from mere love of notoriety, & perhaps carrying off a few votes which are needed for the return of more serious candidates.

This appears reasonable, but I think that **after** depositing **this**

F_018

fixed sum, the candidate should be free to draw upon it for the expense of advertising, & making his claims known to the electors. If his friends & supporters choose to go to expense in committees &

canvassing, there are no means of preventing them ; but such expenses out of the candidate's own pocket, or any expenses whatever beyond the deposit of £ 50 (or £ 100 if preferred) should be illegal & punishable. If there appeared any probability that opinion would refuse to connive at falsehood, a declaration on oath or honor should be required from every member on taking his seat, that he had not, nor would, expend any money directly or indirectly for the purposes of his election, beyond the £ 50 ; & if the assertion were proved to be false or the pledge to have been violated, he should be liable to the penalties of perjury. It is probable that these penalties, by showing conclusively that the legislature was in earnest, would suffice to turn the course of opinion in the same direction, & hinder it from regarding, as it has hitherto done, this most serious offence as a mere venial peccadillo. There has never yet been, among political men, any real & serious attempt to prevent bribery, because there has been no real desire that elections should not be costly. Their costliness is advantageous to those who can afford the expense, by excluding a multitude of competitors, & anything however noxious is cherished as having a conservative tendency, if it limits the access to Parliament to rich men. I firmly believe that this

F_019

is a prevailing feeling in the minds of our legislators generally. They care comparatively little who votes, as long as they are assured that none but those of their own class

can be voted for : they know they can rely on the fellow feeling of one of their class with another, & that nothing very hostile to the class interests or feelings of the rich need be apprehended under the most democratic suffrage as long as democratic persons can be prevented from being elected to Parliament. But what they thus cherish is a mere balancing of evil against evil instead of combining good with good. The object should be to bring together the best members of both classes under a responsibility to both compelling them to pursue their joint interests ; rather than to allow the average class feeling of the Many to work its will under impediments imposed by the class feeling of average individuals among the Few.

There are few modes in which political institutions can be more morally mischievous, can work greater evil through their spirit on the minds of those who are influenced by them, than by representing political functions as a favour to be conferred, a thing which the depository is to ask for as if he desired it for himself much more pay for as if it were intended for his pecuniary benefit. Men are not fond of paying large sums for leave to perform a laborious duty. Plato had a much juster view of the true conditions of good government when he asserted that the persons who should be sought out to exercise power in the state were exactly those who were most personally averse to it, & that the only motive that can be permanently

F_020

relied on inducing the fittest men to take upon themselves the toils of government is the fear of being governed by worse

men. This principle dictates two practical conclusions apparently of contrary tendency but really directed to the same object. On the one hand it demands that no payment of money for the purposes of the election, should be required or tolerated on the part of the person elected. On the other hand, it equally negatives what has often been proposed, as a means of rendering Parliament accessible to persons of all ranks & circumstances, the payment of members of Parliament. If, as in some of our colonies it is difficult to find fit persons who can afford to devote their time to any unpaid occupation the payment should be a reimbursement of losses, not a salary.

The greater latitude of choice which a salary would give, is a merely illusory advantage. No salary which any one would dream of attaching to the post, would attract to it those who were seriously engaged in other professions with a prospect of succeeding in them. The being a member of parliament would therefore become a profession in itself ; & would be carried on like other professions with a view chiefly to its pecuniary returns. It would become an object of desire to adventurers of a low class, & 658 persons in possession with ten or twenty times as many in expectancy would be incessantly occupied in

[F_020 verso blank]

G_001

G

bidding for the suffrages of the electors by promising all things, possible or impossible, & vying with each other in subserviency to the meanest feelings & most prejudiced notions of the vulgarest part of the crowd. Such an institution would be a perpetual blister applied to all the most peccant parts of human nature. It would be offering 658 prizes for the most successful flatterer, the most adroit misleader of a body of his fellow countrymen. Under no despotism has there been such an organized system of tillage for raising a rich crop of courtiership ; & its influences would greatly exacerbate those possible evils of democracy which all endeavours are not more than sufficient to ward off. When by reason of preeminent qualifications (as doubtless would sometimes happen) it was desirable that a person entirely without independent means either derived from property or from a trade or profession, should be brought with Parliament to render services which no other accessible person would render as well, there is the resource of a public subscription ; he might be supported while in Parliament, like Andrew Marvel, by the contributions of his constituents. This would be entirely harmless, for such a reward would never be given to mere subserviency ; bodies of men do not care so much for one sycophant in preference to another, as to go to the expense of his maintenance in order to be flattered by that particular individual. Such a support would only be given in consideration of some striking & impressive personal qualities, which are always a presumption of & generally accompanied with an independent opinion & will.

G_002

Of the duration of Parliaments

After how long a period should members of Parliament be subject to reelection ? The principle involved is very obvious, though its application is a matter of some difficulty. On the one hand, he must not have so long a possession of his seat, as to make him forget his responsibility, take his duties easy, conduct them with a view to his own personal aggrandizement, or neglect those frequent communications with his constituents which, whether he differs or agrees with them, it is important that he should hold & which constitute one of the benefits of representative government. On the other hand, it is desirable that he should look forward to such a term of office as should both enable & induce his constituents to judge of him by their impression of his general conduct, & not by some single vote. It is desirable that he should have the greatest latitude of individual opinion & discretion compatible with the popular control inseparable from free government ; & to this end that control must be exercised, as in any case it is best exercised, after sufficient time has been given for him to show all the qualities he possesses, to show that there is some way, other than that of a mere obedient voter & advocate of their opinions, in which he can render himself in their eyes a desirable & creditable representative. It is impossible to fix by any general rule the boundary between these two principles. Where the democratic power in the constitution is weak or over passive, & requires to be stimulated, three years are the longest period which would be admissible. Where democracy is the ascendant power, & still tending to increase, requiring therefore rather to be moderated in its exercise than encouraged to any

G_003

abnormal activity — & this is likely to be more and more, the case in modern Europe. & less than five years would hardly be a sufficient period of certain _____⁽⁵⁾ to prevent timid subservience. More, as it seems to one, cannot ever be required ; but the present term of seven years appears harmless, & not worth altering for the sake of any benefit that would be produced, especially since the prospect always impending, of an earlier dissolution, keeps the motives for standing well with constituents always before the member's eyes.

Whatever may be the term most desirable for the duration of the mandate, it seems most natural that the individual member should vacate his seat at the expiration of that term from the day of his election, & that there should be no general renewal of the entire House. And this plan has many considerations to recommend it. But it is attended with the great disadvantage, that there would then be no means of promptly getting rid of a majority which had pursued a course offensive to the nation. The certainty of a general election after a limited, which would often be a nearly expired period, & the possibility of having one at any time when the minister either desires it for his own sake, or thinks that it would make him popular with the country, has a strong tendency to prevent that wide divergence between the feeling of the representative assembly & that of the constituency, which might sometimes happen if the majority of the House had always several years of their term still to run. It is as important that the general sense of the House

should accord in the main with that of the nation, as it is

G_004

that distinguished individuals among them should
give free utterance to even the most unpopular sentiments.


It is injurious that an assembly should attempt to
carry out into practice, opinions much in advance of the
people, without labouring to reconcile the people to them for some
time precious, by perpetual explanation & discussion.


There is another reason of some weight against this gradual
& partial renewal of a representative assembly. It is important
that there should be a periodical general muster
of opposing opinions, to gauge, as it were, the state of
the national mind, & ascertain far to dispute the relative
strength of different opinions & parties. This is not done
effectually by any partial renewal, even though, as in some of
the French constitutions, by a large fraction, a fifth or a third at
a time.


The reasons for allowing to the executive the
power of dissolution, will be considered in a subsequent
chapter, in which will be discussed the constitution &
functions of the executive in a representative government.


注 /note

(1) 筆者たちが翻刻できなかったものを画像で示す。以下同じ。



(2) 

(3) 

(4) 

空白部分 (about と ago の間)。ミルが言及している議会改革の小冊子 (pamphlet) は、*Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform* である。初版、第2版はともに1859年に刊行されている (cf., Robson, J. M. Editor of the Text, *Essays on Political and Society by John Stuart Mill. Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Vol. 29. University of Toronto Press. Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1977. p.312.*)。1861年に『代議制統治論』が刊行されているので、この空白部分には、“two years” が記されるはずであったろう (about two years ago)。そして続く “- - - - -” の部分には、『代議制統治論』が刊行されたとき、実際に本小冊子からの引用文が記述されている。

(5) 